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THE CULTURAL EVOLUTION OF TORT LAW*
Abstract
The Institutes of Justinian and other Greco-Roman recitations of tort-type delicts 
and remedies are recognized as root stock of modern western tort law, common law or 
civil code-based alike.  Long before these sources, however, both ancient and primitive 
cultures adopted norms and customs which defined permissible individual and group 
conduct, and which provided for remedies ranging from money damages to banishment.
Among the surveyed examples of ancient cultural responses to tort-type delicts 
were numerous instances in which both the civil wrong identified and the remedy 
provided for can be harmonized readily with modern tort law, whether it is practiced in 
common law or civil code nations or throughout the world.  A broad range of such 
examples can be found not only in the nations or regions in which such norms obtained, 
but also in their specific subject areas: pubic nuisance, manslaughter, assault, trespass, 
conversion, negligence, strict liability, deceit, defamation, and even invasion of privacy.  
Indeed, a review of ancient tort-type law dispels any Euro-centric claim that western 
Europeans led in the conception and nurturance of tort principles at any point in history.
*  M. Stuart Madden, Distinguished Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. I 
would like to thank Myriam Afif and Michael Stalzer for their research assistance in the 
preparation of this article. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Years without number before the coalescence of human groupings into civil 
society, kinship groups, and later tribes and cultures, needed norms by which individual 
conduct could be ordered.  The primary stimulus for such norm was group survival, and 
the ancillary motivations were the achievement of civil peace and the protection of one’s 
person and property from wrongful harm.  The means by which normative behavioral 
impositions operated took countless shapes, but the as a general proposition could be 
classified, in roughly chronological order, as spiritualism, folk tales, folk law, mythology, 
religion and customary law.1
The application of such sources as justification for modern civil decision has 
largely disappeared, although perhaps not entirely.  An electronic search within state and 
federal legislative data bases for “I cannot tell a lie” or “Horatio Alger” would surely 
reveal a cluster of allusions, and the cylclical debate over religion in public affairs 
without more betrays the tenacity of religion’s influence on our public life.  Withal, even 
though the sources of contemporary civil law have changes, the needs of the needs of 
modern society for a similar order and predictability in human civil affairs has not 
changed very much from the needs confronting our ancestors.  It is therefore unsurprising 
that ancient examples of normative beliefs, practices, and customary law reveal sprawling 
similarities with modern tort law.  
At the core of tort norms, and later tort law, has always been a group desire that 
disputes be resolves without retaliation and escalation.  This rationale receives an early 
expression from the Greek observer Demosthenes, in the speech Against Konon, as it 
might pertain to remedies for battery and abuse: “[In] cases of battery . . .; these, I am 
told, exist in order that no one, when losing, should defend himself with a stone or 
anything of that sort, but he should await the legal case. . . . The most trivial offence, I 
suppose, that of abuse, has been provided for to [ensure] that homicide should not be 
committed, . . . but [that] there should be a legal case for each of these, and they should 
1
 For the purposes of this article, the terms “ancient” and “primitive” are distinguished in this way:  
“Ancient” is a designation that the example existed in antiquity.  “Primitive” connotes that the example can 
be identified or hypothesized as existing in preliterate society. 
not be decided by the individual’s anger or whim.”2   Islamic law is also clear cut in its 
differentiation between excusable self-defense and culpable retaliation.3
At the same time, it would be disingenuous to deny that dissimilarities between 
ancient and modern approaches to civil justice are not likewise apparent at almost every 
turn to this inquiry. Some primitive remedies for conversion might offer not only 
restitution to the wronged party but also the opportunity to exact a fine, to be collected by 
the complainant himself, a double recovery by today’s standards.  Other pairings of right 
and remedy might at first suggest of the modern action in public nuisance, but upon 
evaluation be seen to depart from that rule in the designation of who may bring the claim.  
And a very large number of disputes are resolved not by fact-finding, application of 
governing norms, and an ajudicatory declaration, but rather by mediation and 
conciliation, which although a goal in numerous state and federal precincts cannot be 
described as a general rule. 
As suggested, over the ages the nature of offenses that have stimulated 
identification as redressable wrongs has become mostly settled.  The designations of the 
subsections in Part II to this research largely comprise them:  (1) public and private 
nuisance and disturbing the peace; (2) unintentional killing; (3) assault and battery; (4) 
trespass to land and chattels; (5) conversion; (6) negligence; (7) strict liability; (8) deceit 
and false report; (9) defamation and false witness; and, in some cultures, (10) in some 
cultures, covetousness and hoarding.
Describing with confidence the range of remedies for such wrongs, much less 
their varied justifications, is a more difficult task.  Or at least it seems so due to the 
2 DOUGLAS M. MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 123 (Cornell 1978)(Demosthenes 54. 17-
19).
3 See note 27 below and accompanying text. 
diverse ways tort objectives are described – often in terminology that seems not so much 
a dispassionate description than an argument for a polemical position.  Among the more 
interesting groupings of tort objectives can be found in a source one would not at first 
think of:  Friedrich  Nietsche.  In his GENEALOGY OF MORALS  Nietsche identifies a core 
cluster of the objectives of punishment.4  Winnowed of punishments suited to criminal 
actions, one is left with more classically civil, or only quasi-criminal, responses, i.e., the 
types of remedies associated with torts. To Nietsche, these include: “. . . (2)  Punishment 
consisting of the payment of damages to the injured party, including affect 
compensation[;]5   (4)  Punishment as a means of isolation of a disequilibrating agent, in 
order to keep the disturbance from spreading further. . . .[;]6  (8)  Punishment as a means 
of creating memory, either for the one who suffers it – so-called `improvement’ – or for 
the witnesses[;]  (9)  Punishment as the payment of a fee, exacted by the authority which 
protects the evil-doer from the excesses of vengeance[; and (10)]  Punishment as a 
compromise with the tradition of vendetta .  . . . [.]7
A question central to this article can be framed in this way:  When it comes to tort 
law, can it be said that “It has always been thus?” Henry Sumner Maine  observed: 
Now the penal Law of ancient communities is not the law of Crimes; it  is the law of 
Wrongs, or, to use the English technical word, of Torts. The  person injured proceeds 
against the wrong-doer by an ordinary civil action, and  recovers compensation in the 
4 FRIEDERICH NIETSCHE, THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY/ THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS  213  (Francis Golfing, 
ed.)(Doubleday Anchor  1956).
5
 “Affect compensation” may be understood to mean damages for emotional distress.
6
  Particularly among indigenous peoples, a person refusing to follow community norms was perceived, as 
is true in some instances today, to destabilize the community.  As will be seen in the discussion to follow, 
for lesser offenses, the response might be temporary shunning.  For more serious or more sustained delicts, 
the individual might be banned from the group. 
7 FRIEDERICH NIETSCHE, THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY/ THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS  213  (Francis Golfing, 
ed.)(Doubleday Anchor  1956).
shape of money-damages if he succeeds. . . . [All   such Torts] gave rise to an Obligation 
or vinculum juris, and were all requited  by a payment of money. 8  It is noteworthy that 
primitive and ancient law contain numerous examples in which the society has seemingly 
concluded that simple corrective justice is insufficient to the objective of the joint 
objectives of redressing the harm done and also deterring the actor and others.  For 
example, throughout the Tibetan Rules for Punishment, the burden imposed  by the 
restitutionary interest of the rule, i.e., the return of the animal, and elsewhere the 
property, etc., is seemingly ancillary to), the punishment dimension of the rule.  It might 
be surmised that over time the collective wisdom was that simple restorative justice had 
an insufficient gravitas as a deterrent if unaccompanied by a fine payable to the wronged 
party.9  In cases of incorrigibility, though, the penalty might be shunning or even banning 
from the community.10
I have suggested that as a general proposition, spiritualism, folk tales, folk law, 
mythology, religion and customary law underlay ancient law.  The import of spiritualism 
and its more formal successor, religion, is self revealing.  So too mythology with its gods, 
demigods, pantheism and anthropomorphism.  
Customary law is sometimes called the “living law” and has reflected rules to 
which a particular society has assigned epochal steadfast adherence, rules that a culture 
8 HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW  370 (1861).
9
 In this sense, the diverse fines provided for in Tibetan folk law operated as punishment bearing 
similarities to today’s punitive damages.  E.g., Rule20-22, Manchu Imperial Court’s Rules for Punishment 
of Tibetans, in  Sh ih-Yu Yu Li, Tibetan Folk Law, J. ROY. ASIATIC SOC. G.B. & IRELAND Parts 3, 4, pp. 
127-148 (1950), reprinted in RENTELS & DUNDES,  supra note 11 at 27. 
10
 Few societies today maintain gulags to which persons may be banished, although with the passing of 
opportunities to send persons to entirely different continents, such as Australia, prisons and jails serve 
similarly.  Excommunication in the Catholic church harkens of such themes.  In the early church, 
excommunication carried with it the revocation of other ordinary rights in civil society.  This deterrent 
cannot be seen to have worked terribly well, as in the year 1337 it is estimated that half of christendom was 
under sentence of excommunication.   1 ERNST TROELTSCH, THE SOCIAL TEACHINGS OF THE CHRISTIAN 
CHURCHES  234 n.100a (Olive Wyon, trans.)(Harper 1960).
has followed so unflaggingly and consistently as to permit the application of no 
inconsistent rule.  To Sir John Salmond, customary law embraces “any rule of action 
which is actually observed by men – any rule which is the expression of some actual 
uniformity of voluntary  action”, irrespective of whether it is obligatory and enforceable 
or exists by reason of de facto observance.11
What of ancient codes, such as the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi?  Ordinarily 
early codes reflected efforts to gather, rationalize and organize already extant customary 
law.  For all that is apparent, Hammurabi himself intended that his law reconcile wrongs 
and bring justice to those aggrieved.  His unmistakable goal was the economic stability 
and enhancement of the people.12  By way of further example, the “Rules of Punishment 
for Tibetans (1733)”, published by the Manchu Imperial Court, have been interpreted as 
“an attempt to standardize . . . folk law by removing authority from the local chieftans 
and monasteries.”13      It is not surprising that such antecedents of customary law include 
folk law, folk custom and folk tale.
In the many examples of primitive and ancient law to follow, it is seen that the 
norms of conduct, be they characterized as folk law or custom or otherwise, were 
enforced not by any leadership of the community but rather by the whole.  Sometimes in 
literate societies, and invariably in preliterate ones, folk laws and customs, as well as folk 
tales, were dispersed and preserved orally, which has been described as a tradition that  
“represents the complete information deemed essential, retained and codified by a 
11 JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE  §  19 at 55 (Sweet and Maxwell, Ltd. 1929).
12 Id.
13
 Shih-Yu Yu Li, Tibetan Folk Law, J. ROY. ASIATIC SOC. G.B. & IRELAND Parts 3, 4, pp. 127-148 (1950), 
reprinted in 1 ALISON DUNDES RENTELS, ALAN DUNDES, FOLK LAW 520 (1995).  
society, primarily in oral form, in order to facilitate its memorization and ensure its 
dissemination to present and future generations.”14
Of great significance too was the cultural watershed of symboling. Man’s capacity 
for symbolic communication accelerated the development of norms, and the 
characteristic of all such norms was that they confined the realm of permissible 
behaviors.  The higher level functioning of man was more than a boon to man, it was an 
absolute essential to survival.15  Without symboling the communication of norms could 
only survive in a state of enduring retardation, and without norms human life would fall 
into chaos.  As put by Langer, “[M]an can adapt himself to anything his imagination can 
cope with; but he cannot deal with chaos.”16
Early man needed norms and proscriptions to permit his very survival, and this 
need preceded kings, and thus the premium on keeping the “King’s peace”, and even  
large human groupings that could be described as units of the earliest proto civilizations, 
Early man needed norms and proscriptions to permit his very survival.  These norms and 
proscriptions have been described loosely as “natural law”, and the form the foundation 
of all modern law.  Hobbes placed the source of natural law as “reason”, writing in 
LEVIATHAN: “Reason suggesteth convenient Articles of Peace upon which men may be 
drawn to agreement.  These Articles are they which otherwise are called the Laws of 
Nature”.17  T.E. Holland describes the rights conferred by natural law as these: “I.  To 
personal safety and freedom[;] II.  To society and control of one’s family and 
14
 A. Raphael, Oral Tradition at 1 (65th IFLA Conf. - Bankok)(1999).
15
  Of course the human mentality did not come into being and thereupon structure culture around human 
needs.  Rather, the development of an “encephalated nervous system [and the ] capacity to use symbols” 
did not merely permit man to develop culture, it “demand[ed] that he do so if [man was] to function at 
all.[.]”  CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES  68 (1973).
16 LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY 287 (      ), quoted in CLIFFORD GERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF 
CULTURES 99-100 (1973).
17 HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ___ , quoted in T.E. HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE 34 (11th ed.) (1910). 
dependants[;] III.  To reputation[;] IV.  To advantages open to the community generally; 
such as free exercise of one’s calling[;] V. To possession and ownership [; and ] To 
immunity from damage from fraud.”18  The discussion to follow in the next section of 
this article will validate Hobbes’ recitation in that it will show that the norms and 
customs to which man turned his attention from the earliest times bear a similarity –
regular if not perfect - to the natural law described by later theorists.
II. PARTICULAR APPLICATIONS OF ANCIENT TORT LAW
A. Nuisance and Disturbing the Peace
Throughout primitive and ancient law are examples of strictures suggesting that 
the social group placed a greater premium on restoring order and good will than it did on 
determining that one disputant was right and the other wrong.  In Australian aboriginal 
customary law, for example, the objective or resolution of a dispute would more often be 
the quieting of temper and the restoration of a placid community than it would be any 
strict identification of which party was at fault.19
Tibetan folk law demonstrates numerous examples of strictures against what 
today might be termed “public nuisance.”  In the Rules of Punishment for Tibetans 
(1733), Rule No. 26, titled “Making Fire to Burn Wild Animals Out of Their Lairs”, vests 
in the individual who discovers the infraction the remedy of fining the hunter “one 
18 T.E. HOLLAND, id.  at 167.
19
 Kenneth Maddock, Aboriginal Customary Law, Chapter 9 in ABORIGINES AND THE LAW  at 232        
(Peter Hanks, Bryan Keon-Cohen, eds.) (Alen & Unwin, Inc. 1984). Keating references the effect of 
“community opinion about the merits of a case as helping to decide the outsome through its influence 
onboth the disputants and their potential supporters[,]” citing L. R. HIATT, KINSHIP AND CONFLICT: A 
STUDY IN AN ABORIGINAL COMMUNITY IN NORTHERN ARNHEM LAND 146-47 (CANBERRA: ANU PRESS 
1965).
`nine’”.  Reposing the remedy in the person discovering the delict might at first seem like 
an example of the “special injury” rule in public nuisance, in that an individual may bring 
the claim.  Yet in this “Fire” rule there is no articulated need that the reporting 
individual/claimant have suffered any injury at all.  Perhaps the rule simply stands as an 
example of a public nuisance proceeding that can be brought not only by public officials 
but also by individuals, with the inclusion of individuals seen as a prudential device to 
increase deterrence by increasing detection. 
Penalty provisions referencing one or more “nine” or one or more “animals” were 
enforceable with reference to Rule No. 39, which detailed how’ these terms correlated 
with livestock: Rule No. 39 details how the terms “1 nine” or a “Five Animals” correlate 
with livestock: “One `nine’ means a combination of nine animals such as 2 horses, 2 dso, 
2 three-year-old cow 1 two-year old cow.  `Five animals’ means 1 dso, 1 cow, 1 three-
year old cow, and 2 two-year old cows.  The person who comes to demand these fines is 
entitled to receive as his fee 1 three-year old cow from the guilty.  In places where horses 
are plentiful dso may be offered in their stead.”20
Among the Pygmies living in the Ituri Forest of the former Congo, there has long 
been a saying that “a noisy camp is a hungry camp.”21  This is so because the Pygmies 
are hunters, and as is self-evident, unnecessary noise drives the game deeper into the 
forest.  As it might be today, and yet for different reasons, unreasonable noise is therefore 
treated as a nuisance.  Anthropologist Colin Turnbull records and incident in which  the 
father of an attractive village girl chased away a suitor and persisted in his tirade by 
taking apposition in the middle of the village calling for others to support him, and that 
20 Id.
21 COLIN M. TURNBULL, THE FOREST PEOPLE  120 (1962).
failing, took to rattling the roofs of the surrounding huts.  An elder interceded in a calm 
voice:  “You are making too much noise – you are killing the forest, you are killing the 
hunt.It is for us older men to sleep at night and not to worry about the youngsters. They 
know what to do and what not to do.”22  Evidently displeased, the father nevertheless 
accepted the resolution. 
Under Roman Law, the Institutes of Justinian included rules that reveal numerous 
strictures against the imposition of one’s will over the rights of a neighbor, and strong 
deterrents for the disregard thereof. Specifically as to urban estates, is Book III, Title II 
par. 2, as interpreted by Gaius, to which Ulpianus, there was a prohibition on the 
obstruction of a neighbor’s view.23  In one notable example, pertaining to what would 
today be called the law of private nuisance or trespass, another provision goes so far as to 
detail a preference that adjoining landowners bargain in advance for agreement as to 
contemporaneous uses of land that might trigger dispute.  In Book III par. 4, the Institutes 
provide that one “wishing to create” such a right of usage “should do so by pacts and 
stipulations.”  A testator of land may impose such agreements reached upon his heirs, 
including limitations upon building height, obstruction of light, or introduction of a beam 
into a common wall, or the construction of a catch for a cistern, an easement of passage, 
or a right of way to water.24  These last two examples reflect a clear preference for ex 
ante bargaining over economically wasteful ex post dispute resolution.   The provision 
permitting the testator to bind his heirs to any such agreement is additionally efficient in a 
manner akin to the approach that was taken later and famously by Justice Bergen in the 
22 Id. at 19.
23 THE DIGEST (or PANDECTS) BOOK III TITLE II par. 2., par. 3.
24 THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN BOOK III par. 4, supra note 80 at 84, 85.
cement plant nuisance case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., Inc.,25 ensured that its 
award of damages would be indeed a one-time resolution of the dispute by requiring that 
the disposition of the claim be entered and recorded as a permanent servitude on the land.
B. Manslaughter or Wrongful Death
At Sura 4 the Koran prohibits, unsurprisingly, the intentional killing of a believer.  
In traditional Islamic law the unintended killing of another would warrant payment of a 
full diyet, or blood money, set at 3.8 grams of silver.26     Should a believer be killed by 
“mischance”, i.e., accident, the responsible party “shall be bound to free a believer from 
slavery; and the blood money shall be paid to the family of the slain, unless they convert 
it into alms.”27   Killing in self-defense would be unpunished.  Lawrence Rosen explained 
the distinction with the example of one Zeyd, who attacked Amr.  Reviewed by the mufti, 
it was noted that Amr could have rescued himself by calling for help, thus denying him 
the privilege of self-defense.28
There are numerous Eastern examples of the treatment of unintentional killing as 
an offense redressable in money or other damages.  In ancient India, if a person were 
accidentally killed by an animal-drawn vehicle, the driver would be subjected to “the 
same liability as a thief [.]”29    In China,  for injuries resulting in death, traditional law 
distinguished between intentional killing and accidental killing.  T’ang Code Article 339 
provided that “All cases of accidentally (kuo shih) killing or injuring someone follow the 
25
 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
26 HAIM GERBER, STATE, SOCIETY AND THE LAW IN ISLAM 36 (SUNY 1994).
27
 Sura 4, ll. 90-100, THE KORAN  (J.M.Rodwell, Trans.)(Everyman 1994).
28 GERBER,  supra note 25, citing  Lawrence Rosen, Responsibility and Compensatory Justice in Arab Law 
and Culture, in SEMIOTICS, SELF AND SOCIETY 101-19 (Benjamin Lee and Greg Urban, ed.)(New York 
1989).
29 THE LAW CODE OF MANU 145 (Patrick Olivelle, trans.)(Oxford 2004).
manner in which the death occurs and treat as redeemable.”30  By “redeemable” is meant 
that the offense may be expiated by the payment of money to the victim’s family.  The 
analogous provision in the Ch’ing Code describes accidental killing (wu sha) in the 
context of hunting for game (his sha).  It states that for an accidental killing the 
punishment should be the same as for a killing in a fight, except that “redemption is 
permitted”.  The Ch’ing Code gives such examples as an accidental death “where one is 
shooting wild animals or for some reason is throwing bricks or tiles”; “climbing and 
one’s fall causes others to fall; navigating a boat by sail, riding a horse that becomes 
frightened, driving a cart downhill, or lifting an object when “one lacks the strength to 
sustain it and someone else is harmed[.”  In each such instance, when “there has been no 
intention to harm”, the Code provides that “the sentence is to conform with the 
punishment for killing or injuring in a fight”, but redemption is permitted, with “the 
money to be given to the family of the person killed or as a contribution to funeral or 
medical expenses.”31
C. Assault and Battery
It is an historical verity that intentional battery is an offense that creates a high 
risk of retaliation, or self help, an yet some Native American groups even made 
allowance for it, while at the same time providing for the intercession of village council.32
30 GEOFFREY MACCORMACK, THE SPIRIT OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE LAW  38 (Georgia 1996)
31 Id. at 39 (citations omitted).
32 ASIAN INDIGENOUS LAW: AN INTERACTION WITH RECEIVED LAW 251 (Masaji Chiba, ed.)(Methuan 1986) 
(indigenous law governing the Konyak Nagas of India).
Other Indian groups, in contrast, demonstrate “a general disapproval of `retaliation as a 
means of obtaining justice’”.33
Putting aside its punishment of death for one who strikes his mother or father,34
under the Torah one who inflicts a direct nonmortal blow to another will not be liable if 
the victim is able to get up and about, “even with a stick”, providing an interesting early 
invocation of the principle de minimis non curat lex.  If, however, the injury is 
sufficiently serious that the victim is temporarily incapacitated, the aggressor “must 
compensate him . . . for his enforced inactivity, and care for him until he is completely 
cured”.35   This approach contemplates not only recovery for economic loss 
(compensation for “enforced inactivity”), and also rehabilitation expenses.  
In Islamic law, compensatory justice for injurious battery might provide for 
damages according to a schedule keyed to the severity of the harm, rather as might 
modern workers compensation.  Liability might be according to diyet, or blood money.36
Full blood money due for the unintentional death of the victim was set at 10,000 dirham, 
or 3.8 grams of silver.37  Serious injury to the hand, the leg or the eye was compensable 
with half blood money.  Loss of a tooth might warrant 1/20 blood money.38
The Koran is not pacifistic by any means, and does not feign to offer by its rules 
remedies to persons that may avoid injury by resort to self-help, or by means of  
retaliation.  While the Koran explains that God does not countenance attacking others 
33 Id at 253 (law of Gond in India).
34
  “ Anyone who strikes his father or mother must die.  Anyone who abducts a man-whether he has sold    
him or is found in possession of him-must die.  Anyone who curses father or mother must die.”  THE 
JERUSALEM BIBLE , EXODUS 21: 15 (Doubleday 1966)(hereinafter the “BIBLE”).
35 Id., EXODUS 21: 18-19.
36 GERBER,  supra note 25 at 33.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 35
first, Muslims may fight for the cause of God against those who fight you [.]”39   Is it then 
paradoxical that it may be true that, as some scholars claim, “that the function of law in 
Islam is merely to get people back on the negotiating track.”40  This perception pertains 
instead to a goal that the state attend to affairs of government, not religion, and that Islam 
attends to religion, and not to the state, and that it is in these subject matters that the 
“negotiating” ideal obtains.41 Within the tribal customary law of the Awlad Ali of Egypt, 
for battery resulting in injury diyah, or blood money, would be paid to the family of the 
victim, together with kebara, calculated in money and animals.42
Under The Rules of Punishment for Tibetans, battery could incur variable fines 
depending upon the severity of injury.  A fine of three “nines” would be levied for a fight 
resulting in an injury to the eye, hand, or foot, although if the injury was such as could be 
cured, the fine was one “nine”, as was true also for a fight causing the loss of teeth, or an 
abortion (one “nine”).  When hair would be torn off, the fine was five animals. 43
In ancient Indian law, the “low born” were treated very differentially than were 
the Brahmins.  For injurious assaults against one of a superior caste, punishment ranged 
from amputation of the limb injured by the assailant, banishment or exile, or for spitting 
on one’s superior, the cutting off of the assailant’s lips.44  Other aggression causing injury 
39
 Sura 2  ¶ 186, T HE KORAN.
In the classical Islamic theory of the state.  The state was seen not as the instrument for the 
application of law, nor were the courts . . . envisioned as vehicles for economic redistribution or 
the consequences of a particular political order.
LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTICE   61  (Cambridge, 1989), quoted in GERBER, supra
note 25 at 59 (SUNY 1994). 
42 ASIAN INDIGENOUS LAW, supra note       at 65.
43
  Rule 28, Rules of Punishment for Tibetans, in Shih-Yu Yu Li, Tibetan Folk Law, J. ROY. ASIATIC SOC. 
G.B. & IRELAND Parts 3, 4, pp. 127-148 (1950), reprinted in RENTELS & DUNDES,  supra note 11 at 520.
44 CODE OF MANU  supra note 28 at 144.
and pain to another (or to an animal) called for the king to “impose a punishment 
proportionate to the severity of the pain.”45
Lastly, pursuant to Greek law, striking another gave rise to a private cause of 
action in battery (dike aikeias).  If liability would be found, it would ordinarily be against 
the one striking the first blow. The penalty would be an amount payable in money 
damages as assessed by a jury.46
D. Trespass to Land and Chattels
In the authoritative and ancient work Manu, entitled alternatively “The Law Code 
of Manu” or “Manava Dharmasastra”, the text references ancient Indian law governing 
the trespass of animals.  For such fields surrounding a settlement as are left open, any 
farm animal damage to crops should not be punished.  To receive any protection for one’s 
fields, a person “should erect a fence over which a camel cannot look and cover any hole 
through which a dog or pig could poke his head.”47   For damage caused by herded 
livestock to such fenced land, a fine of 100 should be imposed – and if the livestock are 
unherded, they should be impounded. For livestock damage to other fields, “one and a 
half Panas should be assessed for each animal”, and the owner of the land should be 
compensated for any crop loss.48
Prior to the laws of Hammurabi49 there were published the laws of King Ur-Nami  
and Lipit-Ishtar.  Read together as principal sources of the law of ancient Babylonia, 
there is seen an emphasis on the protection of person, property and commerce from 
45 Id. at  144 .
46 MACDOWELL,  supra note 2 at 122 (Demosthenes 47.45-7, 47.64; Isok. 20.19.
47 CODE OF MANU, supra note 28 at 141.
48 Id. 
49 Supra note 10.
forced divestiture of a right or a prerogative.  Regarding navigation, a collision between 
two boats on a body of water having a perceptible upstream and downstream would 
trigger a presumption of fault on the part of the upstream captain, on the logic – faulty or 
not --- that the upstream captain had a greater opportunity to reduce avoidable accidents 
than did his counterpart, as the former would be traveling at a slower speed.50
Anglo-American common law trespass can includes numerous instances in which 
a landowner is held liable in trespass if a structure or an activity on the first individual’s 
property causes damages, by diversion of water or otherwise, to the land of another.   In 
Athenian law is found the account of Against Kallikle, recorded by Demosthenes, in 
which it appears that Kallike and a neighbor both lived on a hillside.  Kallikes 
constructed a wall to protect his land from water runoff from rainfall, which wall served 
this purpose, but also diverted water onto his neighbor’s property.  For this trespass, 
Kallikes was fined in damages (kike blabes) a sum of 1000 drachmas.51
In ancient Athens, an action for destruction of or damage to chattels was defined 
in a way as to seeming merge the modern notions of trespass to chattels and conversion.  
An action for “damage” could be brought for any “physical damage to a piece of 
property, such as to destroy it or make it useless or less valuable than before, but without 
taking it away [.]”52
Tibetan folk law includes methods of economic recovery, recovery in kind, and 
punitive consequences that bespeak strong deterrence objectives.  Should trespassing 
50 DRIVER AND MILLS, BABYLONIAN LAW S 431-432, referenced in RUSS VERSTEEG, EARLY 
MESOPOTAMEAN LAW 130 (2000). The author questions the reliability of this, as to the author’s limited 
knowledge, the downstream boat in an encounter with an upstream boat is the boat fighting the current.  
Irrespective, the point made is the same.
51 MACDOWELL, supra note 2 at 136 (Demosthenes 55), citing H. J. Wolff, AM. J. PHILOLOGY 64 (1943). 
52 Id. at 149 (Demosthenes 21.50). 
cattle damage one’s field, the owner of the cattle may appropriately seize the cattle 
pending payment for the damage.  Should the land at issue be not a field but instead a 
pasture utilized by nomads for the grazing of their animals, Tibetan folk law proscribes 
the trespassing of one nomadic tribe’s cattle on the pasture of another tribe.  Again the 
trespassing cattle may be seized pending payment for the harm done.  Should the grazing 
be done in the course of a caravan’s passage through the territory of another tribe, a 
pristinely market-based transaction is expected.  The traveling tribe offers to the local 
tribal chieftain a gift of “grass money”, to compensate for the grass the herd is expected
to graze.
The 1733 Rules of Punishment for Tibetans published by the Manchu Imperial 
Court contains provision for trespass to or conversion of another’s animals.  Pursuant to 
Rule No. 30, “Injury to Other People’s Animals”, provides that should the animal of 
another be killed, the perpetrator is fined one “nine”, and also must pay the full value of 
the animal to the owner.  If a horse is shot and killed, two horses must be given in 
compensation.  If the horse is only injured, a fine of a two-year old cow is levied.53
In ancient India, should a cart or coach kill a large animal (such as a cow or an 
elephant) its owner (if the driver was unskilled) would be fined half the amount that 
would be applicable if the offense had been theft.  For the similar death of a small farm 
animal, the fine would be 200; for a “beautiful animal” such as a bird, the fine would be 
50, and for a donkey, a sheep or a goat, 1 Masa.54
E. Conversion or Theft
53
 Shih-Yu Yu Li, Tibetan Folk Law, J. ROY. ASIATIC SOC. G.B. & IRELAND Parts 3, 4, pp. 127-148 (1950), 
reprinted in RENTELS & DUNDES, supra note at 27.  
54 CODE OF MANU, supra note   at 145.
In our time, we can refer to the children’s expression “Cross my heart, hope to 
die” as an affirmation of the community’s disproval of deceit.55  The proscription of 
trespass to chattels or conversion, the occurrence of which has always been common to 
the playground, remains imbedded in several children’s’ rhymes that indicate the 
strongest community aversion to any initiative by a giver of goods to engage in self help 
to regain possession.56  One such folk proscription is found in a French children’s rhyme, 
reduced in writing as “Once given away, stays given; taking away is stealing.”57  More 
severe consequences are opportuned in a saying attributed to Dutch, Flemish, German 
and French children, to this effect:  “Once given, taken away, go to Hell three times.”58
During the Egyptian Sixth Dynasty, from approximately 2460 to 2200 B.C., the 
law bled together the notions of theft as a criminal action as opposed to conversion, to be 
prosecuted by a civil complainant.  During the reign of Pepi I, c. 2325, there was 
appointed a prosecutor named Weni, who presided over these and other matters, and 
whose recitations of the matters brought before him gives evidence of the law employed 
and the remedies exacted.59  In one such suit Weni recounts being sent by the king “to 
prevent [the army] from taking bread or sandals from a wayfarer, to prevent any one of 
them from taking a loin-cloth from any village, to prevent any one of them from taking 
any goat from any people.”60    Upon a finding of responsibility, the remedy exacted 
would typically be that of requiring the thief to return any stolen goods to the victim, and 
55 RENTELN & DUNDES,  supra note   at 417-419.  See brief essay of A. F. Chamberlain, including other 
examples. 
56
 In general terms, as has often been put, “the common law does not favor self help.” A.W.B. Simpson, 
The Common Law in Legal Theory 121, in  1 FOLK LAW:   ESSAYS IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LEX 
NON SCRIPTA  (Alison Dundes Rentleln, Alan Dundes, eds.)(1994).
57
 A.E. Chamberlain, Legal Folklore of Children 419, at id.
58 Id.
59 RUSS VERSTEEG, LAW IN ANCIENT EGYPT  161  (2002)
60 Id., quoting GARDINER, EGYPT OF THE PHAROAHS 96 (       ).
also to pay the victim damages in the amount of a multiple, often two to three times, the 
value of the property asported.61
In ancient Greece there was followed an approach consistent with that of so-called 
“civilized” societies and pre-literate societies alike throughout the world.  That approach 
was a two-pronged response to conversion of chattels.  First, the wrongdoer must give up 
the wrongfully gained property.  Second, the perpetrator should be punished.  Following 
successful prosecution of a claim for theft (dike klopes) The punishment might be the 
payment of a fine gauged at twice the value of the property.  In egregious instances, an 
additional penalty of time in public stocks.62
For some theft the remedy would be restitution in some fixed amount, or in a 
multiple of the value of what was stolen.  The same would be required of any knowing 
receiver of any such stolen goods.63  Among Indian indigenous groups, cash fines might 
be levied for petty thefts.64
As with Native Americans, among certain African tribes theft is rare.  One 
anthropologist assigned the reason to be that the tribal members have few individual 
possessions.65   However other delicts resembling theft might be treated with great 
seriousness.  Among the Pygmies living in the Ituri Forest of the former Congo, the men 
hunted and still hunt as groups, with some acting as beaters to drive game in a certain 
direction, and the others setting nets at agreed-upon locations.  As Colin Turnbull 
describes it, “In a small and tightly knit hunting band, survival can be achieved only by 
61 Id. at 162, citing MCDOWELL, JURISDICTION 230 (         ).
62 MACDOWELL,  supra  note     at  148-47 (citing Demosthenes 24.105, 24.114; Lysias 29.11).
63 A HISTORY OF ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN LAW  81  (Raymond Westbrook, ed.)(Brill 2003)(citations 
omitted). 
64 ASIAN INDIGENOUS LAW, supra note     at 239.
65 COLIN M. TURNBULL, THE FOREST PEOPLE  120 (1962).
the closest cooperation and by an elaborate system of reciprocal obligations which 
insures that everyone has some share of the day’s catch.  Some days one gets more than 
others, but nobody goes without.”66  In one incident that Turnbull recorded, a member of 
the hunting party set up his nets in a place that garnered for him a comparative advantage 
over the hunters.  Brought to task, the hunter returned to camp and  Returns to camp and 
“ordered his wife to turn over the spoils.”67  Interestingly, the wrongdoer’s amenability to 
accept this result might have been affected by his recognition that he could not, as a 
practical matter defy it, recognizing that he was not in a position to break away from his 
group, as  “his band of four or five families was too small to make an efficient hunting 
unit.”68  More generally, for theft among the Pygmies, the frustrated nocturnal theft of 
food from a neighbor’s pot, punishment might include public whipping or shunning.69
All bodies of folk law contain proscriptions on conversion.  For Tibetans, 
pursuant to the Rules for Punishment of Tibetans of the Manchu Imperial Court, a theft of 
domestic animals such as “dogs or pigs” could result in a fine, recoverable by the 
wronged party, of five “animals”.  Theft of other domestic animals, such as fowl, was 
treated variously, with conversion of fowls punishable by a fine of a three-year-old cow.  
Additionally, in each instance the stolen animal had to be returned.70
For theft of personalty (“gold, silver, sable, otter skin, hides, money, cloth, food, 
etc.”) the malefactor was required to return property “of equal value”.  In addition, fines 
66 Id. at 107.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 120-21.
70
 Rule 20, “Theft of Domestic Animals”,  Manchu Imperial Court’s Rules for Punishment of Tibetans, in
Sh ih-Yu Yu Li, Tibetan Folk Law, J. ROY. ASIATIC SOC. G.B. & IRELAND Parts 3, 4, pp. 127-148 (1950), 
reprinted in RENTELS & DUNDES, supra note   at  525.  
would be imposed, keyed to the value of the stolen goods, e.g., three “nines” for the theft
of a two and one half year old cow; one “nine” for a sheep; and a three year-old cow for 
the theft of an animal of lesser value than a sheep.71
Conversion or theft is prohibited of Muslims. As expressed in Sura 7:”Give . .  . 
the full in measures and weights; take from no man his chattels, and commit no disorder 
on the earth after it has been made so good.”72   Muslims on pilgrimage are instructed to 
kill no game in the lands through which thy journey.  If such game is purposefully killed, 
the person responsible shll compensate for it “in domestic animals of equal value (as 
determined by two persons in the group), or feed the poor, or fast “that he may teaste the 
ill consequences of his deed.”73   Although hunting will be prohibited for pilgimms,74 it is 
lawful for them “to fish in the sea[.]”75
The same general approach is true of customary law.  Among agricultural 
community of the Konyak Nagas of India, conversion might be punished by fines, 
although the stricter penalty of banishment might be reserved for chronic offenders.76
Folk stories too have long carried social norms from generation to generation.  
Joel Chandler Harris, in his writing of the Uncle Remus stories, comments upon how 
story and fable transport the listener from the common reality of known things into the 
emotive state of feeling – wherein lay the enduring power of oral history and fable.77
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 Rule 21, “Theft of Domestic Animals”,  Manchu Imperial Court’s Rules for Punishment of Tibetans, in
Sh ih-Yu Yu Li, Tibetan Folk Law, J. ROY. ASIATIC SOC. G.B. & IRELAND Parts 3, 4, pp. 127-148 (1950), 
reprinted in RENTELS & DUNDES, supra note      at 525.  
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74 Id., see also id. at  ¶  97.
75 Id. ¶   97.
76 ASIAN INDIGENOUS LAW, supra note      at 251.
77
  In the course of one story in which Uncle Remus finds himself obliged to feint and weave in a particular 
story in response to a boy’s inquiry, Harris writes: 
In one Indian folk tale even a thief’s theft of a mason’s services creates an 
opportunity for some sanctimonious advice on victim responsibility.  The story, entitled 
The Burglar’s Gift, describes a mason who had once learned the lesson posed to The 
beating suspended, the mason gathered himself to go home, only to have the burglar 
those who do business for dishonest persons, but who found himself  so in need of work 
that he agreed to build a cellar for a man of suspicious character, indeed, “he was 
reported to be a thief and burglar[.]”  The mason complete the work and was invited to 
the burglar’s home “to receive his humble reward[.]”  Arriving the following morning, 
the mason was distressed to see that he was the only guest, and his alarm only grew 
greater as the burglar’s tone grew hostile and he began to beat the mason.  "I shall return 
to you every piece taken in wages," said the mason, "and the greatest reward for me is to 
let me go." But the appeal fell on deaf ears and the host relished every lash he gave to the 
mason. The latter invoked all the holy angels, the Holy Book and God to rid himself of 
the present misfortune. At last the burglar seemed to have got tired and stopped. 
The beating suspended, the mason gathered himself to go home, only to have the 
burglar bid him to sit down.  After a fine meal, the burglar presented the mason “a 
malmal (turban) and a five rupee note by way of reward.”  While confused at “this 
paradoxical behaviour of the burglar[,]”, the mason accepted these gifts and asked again 
to go.  "I shall be most happy to bid you good-bye after I place a valuable and an 
everlasting gift at your feet," said the burglar. The burglar continued, "You did not ask 
Indeed, one of the queerest results of the old man’s manner of telling stories  --  the charm of 
which cannot be reproduced in cold type – was that all the animals, and all of the characters that 
figured there, were taken out of the reality which we know, and transported bodily into that realm 
of reality which we feel:  the reality that lies far beyond the commonplace, everyday facts that 
constitute not the least of our worries.
JOEL CHANDLER HARRIS, UNCLE REMUS RETURNS 62, 63 (1918).
me why I belaboured you so heartlessly?" To both of these declarations the mason did not 
respond.  "Look," said the burglar, "what I gave you as tokens of my appreciation will 
last a short while and disappear. What I want to give you now will last for ever and is 
sure to pass from one generation to another, and why I gave you a beating thus was to 
imprint the lesson indelibly on your mind and body so that you never lose sight of the 
great truth. The lesson I want you to learn is that you need not fear thieves and burglars 
as long as your doors and windows are well bolted and hasped. On the basis of my 
professional experience my advice to you is that you should always keep your windows 
and doors properly hasped and bolted at night to be free of the fear of thieves. You will 
please excuse me for the beating but the lesson had to be rubbed in thoroughly."
F. Negligence
Some scholars assert that the concept of “the reasonable man” was common to all 
ancient cultures.78 The historical record seems to provide support for this.  For example, 
under ancient Mesopotamian law, for negligently cause personal injury, such as in a 
brawl, the wrongdoer might be responsible for the person’s medical expenses, with 
provision too for the time he was invalided,79 a provision quite similar to that contained 
in the Code of the Covenant referenced above.80
78 GERBER, supra note      at 34.  The author therein references the administration of Islamic law of the 
Byzantine Empire, a codification of ancient customary law, which contains contains reference to a dispute 
arising from a claim of a coachman who was claimed to have beaten his horses so severely that they bolted 
and injured a child.  From the record it appears that the coachman was permitted to interpose the defense 
that he had acted reasonably, and the disputants were permitted to present evidence that he had not. Id.
79
  LH 206; HL 10.  .  See also; Exod. 21:18-19, discussed in A HISTORY OF ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN LAW, 
supra note   at 82.
80 Supra note    .
Further evidence in early Msopotamian law of  a neighbor’s duty to another is 
found in a rule that neighbors were bound by rules that served to deter letting one’s 
unoccupied land elevate a risk of trespass or burglary to the neighboring property.  The 
Law of Lipit-Ishtar provided that upon notice from one neighbor that a second neighbor’s 
unattended property provided access to the complainant’s property by potential robbers, 
that should a robbery occur, the inattentive neighbor would be liable for any harm to the 
complainant’s home or property.81
Rules for Punishment of Tibetans No. 26, reference earlier regarding it public 
nuisance implications,82  also provides that witnesses (“those in sight”) of a “fir[e] caused 
by carelessness”  are “intitled to fine the guilty 5 animals.”  If the carlelessly started fire 
kills and individual, the fine is one “nine”. 83  Those carelessly handling firearms  
“without justifiable causes”, and irrespective of injury, could be fined two “nines” for 
Ch`inbu, one “nine” for Paibu, seven animals for centurions, five for lesser centurions, 
and three for commoners and lesser elders.84
As to private nuisance, ancient Mesopotamia the codified customary law provided 
specifically for redress should one’s irrigation waters overflow onto another’s property or 
crops.  Particularly harsh legal consequences might be visited upon the landowner who 
failed to contain his irrigation canals, as flooding of the water might “result not only in 
leaving crops and cattle dry and parched in one point, but also widespread floods in 
81 LIPIT-ISHTAR § 11, in EARLY MESOPOTAMEAN LAW, supra note      .
82 Supra note       .
83
  Shih-Yu Yu Li, Tibetan Folk Law, J. ROY. ASIATIC SOC. G.B. & IRELAND Parts 3, 4, pp. 127-148 
(1950), reprinted in RENTELS &  DUNDES, supra note     at  526. For definitions of “nines’, see above           
and accompanying notes.
84
 Rule No. 27, id. at 526.
another part of the district.”85  In the simple case involving only damages grain, 
replacement of a like amount might give sufficient remedy.  But an unmistakably 
message of severe consequences would be clear to those knowing that should the careless 
farmer be unable to replace the grain, the neighbors might be permitted to sell his 
property to sell him into slavery to achieve justice.86
Other Babylonian law imposed upon home dwellers a duty not to permit their 
homes to be come private nuisances, at lease insofar as an unoccupied home might 
become a hiding place for thieves or burglars.  Neighbors in turn were bound by rules 
that served to deter letting one’s unoccupied land elevate a risk of trespass or burglary to 
the neighboring property.  The Law of Lipit-Ishtar provided that upon notice from one 
neighbor that a second neighbor’s unattended property provided access to the 
complainant’s property by potential robbers, that should a robbery occur, the inattentive 
neighbor would be liable for any harm to the complainant’s home or property.87
The logic of the “failure to cover a ditch” cases that are a mainstay of modern 
casebooks88 is reflected in Code of the Covenant provisions providing that should one 
leave a ditch uncovered and an ox or a donkey falls into it, he must pay the owner 
(although he gets to keep the dead animal as his own!).89
Thus in order that we may receive such blessings as are identified in the maxims 
such as “Keep no one from a running stream[;]” or “Let anyone who pleases take a light 
from your fire[;]” or Give honest advice to a man in doubt[;]” Cicero writes, it follows 
85 DRIVER AND MILLS, BABYLONIAN LAW 50, from EARLY MESOPOTAMEAN LAW, supra note    at 136.
86 HAMMURABI § 54, in EARLY MESOPOTAMEAN LAW, supra note    at 136.  See also Raymond Westbrook, 
Slave and Master, 70 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 1631, 1644 (1995).
87 LIPIT-ISHTAR § 11. in EARLY MESOPOTAMEAN LAW, supra note    at 136. .
88 See, e.g.,       .
89 BIBLE , EXODUS 21: 33-34.
that we must be willing to give likewise of the same in order to “contribute to the 
common weal.”90
In Roman law, among the delicts of greatest importance were included damage to 
property, real and personal, and the action injuriarum for personal physical harm to 
others.  The victim could bring an action for “profitable amends”, or money damages, or 
“honorable amends”, which is to say, a formal and public apology.  As had been 
advanced in theory by Socrates, the latter remedy would most likely arise in setting in 
which dignitary torts, such as defamation. Committed to the identification of the 
delineation between “what is “just and what unjust”, the Institutes of Justinian and other 
sources of Roman law reflected an endeavor to “give each man his due right”, and 
comprises “precepts” to all Romans “to live justly, not to injure another and to render to 
each his own.”91  Violation of a “personal action” not sounding in contract is in delict.92
In the law of ancient India there were rules for accidents caused by animal-drawn 
vehicles.  If the driver was unskilled, and the accident was “due to the driver’s 
incompetence”, the owner of the vehicle would be fined “200” and “all the risers should 
be fined 100.”  If the driver was skilled, he would sustain the fine. 
G. Strict Liability
A commonly cited Law Code provision of Hamurabi  treats the imposition of 
strict liability when one’s animal injures another: “ If an ox gores an a ox and causes its 
death, the owners of both oxen shall divide the value of the live ox and the carcass of the 
90 Id. at 23.
91 THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN BOOK I, Preamble; par. 1; par. 3, at THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 84, 85 
(J.A.C. Thomas trans)(1975).
92 GAIUS, THE INSTITUTES OF ROMAN LAW, Fourth Commentary par. 3  in THE INSTITUTES OF ROMAN LAW 
BY GAIUS 442- 443 (E. Post Trans. 1925)(J.A.C. Thomas trans.)(1975).
dead ox.” 93 Mosaic law too provides that “If an ox gore man or a woman that they die, 
then the ox shall be surely stoned and his flesh shall not be eaten.”94 The proscription on 
eating the animal, which is permitted when an ox gores another ox, has been attributed 
described as a recognition that “the animal has killed a superior in the cosmic order, 
namely a human being.”95
The Code of the Covenant addresses the issue somewhat more particularly.  There 
is no strict liability if the ox has not gored before, the penalty will be that the ox be 
stoned, and its flesh uneaten.  If, on the other hand, the ox “has been in the habit of 
goring before”, and its owner is aware of this, if the ox kills a man or a woman the ox 
should be stoned and its owner put to death.96  In a seeming endeavor to ameliorate such 
harsh consequences, the Code also states that if instead the careless owner has assigned to 
him a “ransom”, he may “pay whatever is imposed, to redeem his life.”97  Deaths of  
children are treated with markedly less severity, as the payment of a ransom is the sole 
prescribed punishment, and the goring of a slave presumptively even less severely – the 
stoning of the ox and the payment of thirty shekels.98
Such forms of strict liability have persisted to this day.  Using an example of 
Salmond’s: “If my horse or ox escapes from my land to that of another man, I am 
answerable for it without any proof of negligence.”99  While this application of strict 
liability fortrespass may be based in a reasonable presumption of negligence upon such 
occurrences, Salmond suggests that it’s truer origins may be in a vicarious liability 
93 ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN LAW, supra note     at 17.
94 BIBLE, EXODUS xxxi.(21), 28,[32],  cited  in JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE  §  148 at 373 (Sweet and 
Maxwell, Ltd. 1929).
95 ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN LAW, supra note     at   77. 
96 BIBLE , EXODUS 21: 28-30.
97 Id., EXODUS 21: 30.
98 Id., EXODUS 21: 31-32.
99 JOHN SALMOND, supra note       at  372, citing Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co., L. R. C. P. 10.
liability placing upon the owner of property responsibility fo r injuries caused by such 
property, such as a master’s responsibility for the actions of his slaves under Roman 
law.100
I.  Defamation and False Witness
In the speech Against Konon, Demosthenes gives the rationale for a vivil action 
for slander in these words:  For instance, there are cases of slander; these, they say, were 
instituted in order that men who are abused should not be induced to hit one another.”101
            In ancient Egypt, one tired for defamation could, as today, interpose truth as a 
defense.  Interestingly, if found liable, the libellant was not punished for this first 
transgression.  Instead, he or she was required to take an “oath of mutilation”, 
covenanting that they would submit to amputation of their nose, ears, or each should they 
engage in a further transgression.102    In the Koran, Sura 104 condemns “every backbiter, 
defeamer.”  It attributes to the amassing and storing of wealth as though it might be kept 
by him forever.  The defamer can more realistically forsee, Sura 104 suggests, “being 
flung into the Crushing Fire.”103
Elsewhere the Koran condemns anyone defaming a “virtuous” woman unless the 
author of the writing or utterance has four witnesses who support the account.  Without 
the witnesses, in which Sura 24 is seemingly more interested in than whether or not the 
account is true, the responsible party will receive “four score stripes”, and is barred en 
100 Id. at 373.
101 MACDOWELL, supra note      at  123      (Demosthenes 54. 17-19).
102 LAW IN ANCIENT EGYPT, supra note      at 179, citing BEDELL, CRIMINAL LAW 138 (    ).
103
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perpetuity from giving testimony.104  Should a husband accuse his wife, the word of God 
pays no heed to the testimony of witnesses and instead requires the husband to first 
testify four times as to the truth of the accusation.  When the husband repeats the 
accusation the fifth time, if he is untruthful, “the malison of god be upon him[.]”  If in his 
fifth oath the husband speaks the truth, it will “call down the wrath of God” upon the 
wife.105  Republishers of a defamation too would face a “sore” punishment.106
In an example of variations in the severity of the response to a delict turning on 
the status of the victim, under ancient Indian law, defamation of a Brahmin by a lesser 
caste might be punished corporally.  For more prosaic libel and slander between social 
equivalents, a fine would be the suitable punishment.107   This differentiation seems to be 
the exception that test the rule of equal protection represented more generally throughout 
ancient law.108
Pursuant to Mesopotamian law, should the slander pertain to the sexual honor of 
another, the punishment might be shaming or flogging.109   This was true also of the 
Torah.110  Locke would later describe such rules as those of “positive morality”, or “the 
104
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law of opinion or of reputation”.  To Locke, such rules “consis[t] of the rules imposed by 
society upon its members and enforced by public censure or disapprobation.”111
H. Deceit and False Report
Prohibitions upon making of false reports have been quite common throughout 
legal systems or groupings or legal norms.  The Koran provides that one committing an 
“involuntary fault” (suggesting negligence or even blamelessness) or a crime but who 
then “layeth [the blame] on the innocent” will be punished by being required to “bear the 
guilt of calumny and of a manifest crime.”112
In Tibetan folk law, deceit regarding the ownership of animals was punishable 
more severely than even the intentional killing of an animal.  Within its rules regarding 
lost animals, Rule 30 of the Manchu Imperial Court’s Rules for Punishment of Tibetans 
provided for a fine of three “nines” for anyone “falsely claiming possession of such an 
animal”, and one “nine” for anyone attempting to hide them.113  In other instances too the 
punishment of deceit exceded that applicable to delicts involving of demonstrably or 
arguably less economic dislocation.  An individual falsely reporting a theft could be fined 
three “nines”, with the fine distributable equally “between the elder in charge and the 
person falsely charged.”114  Vigilence against deceit is manifest further in Rule 19, 
pertaining to land transfers.  For any new transferee discover “traces” of another’s 
pasturage within three days of the vesting of the transferred interest, the new transferee 
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must so report within three days.  The transferor must thereupon “swear an oath” that 
there exist no competing pasturage or third-party rights on the land.115
The Koran reflects God’s prohibition of  deceit, as followers are enjoined to “be 
not false in your own engagements, with your own knowledge.”116  Additionally, in the 
circumstance of a death, the Koran details the testimony that must be sworn and the 
accompanying safeguards against deceit.  Two “just” men are to be chosen to swear as to 
the circumstances of the death, and included inthat oath should be words to the effct that 
“`We will not take a bribe though the party be of kin to us.” 117  Importantly, any oath of 
the frist two men selected can  be challenged “if it be made clear that both have been 
guilty of falsehood[.]”  Should this occur, two other men “nearest in blood” to the first 
affiants will speak to the truth.  The scripture notes with satisfaction that the prospect of a 
challenge to the veracity of the first oaths will facilitate truth telling in the first instance:  
“Thus it will be easier for men to bear a true witness, or fear lest after their oath another 
oath be given.”118
Differing from but related to deceit, an act of “imposture” is interpreted to mean 
taking undue advantage of another through the device of being an “imposter”.  It is 
logical that in defense of the faith adherents to the Koran would be sensitive to claims 
that they themselves were imposters for proclaiming Muhammad’s words as those of 
God.  To this claim Sura 10 reinforces believers with the suggestion that “[I]f they charge 
you with imposture, then SAY: My work for me, and your work for you.  You are clear 
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of that which I do, and I am clear of that which ye do.119  Elsewhere at Sura 22 believers 
castigated as imposters are reminded that they can recall to their accusers that so many of 
the great and accepted prophets, including Abraham, Noah and others, were so charged 
and ultimately prevailed.120
J. Covetousness and Hoarding
Among certain Aleutian groups, cultural and economic norms developed to 
protect limited resources and to deter non-cooperative appropriation or hoarding.  The 
indigenous tribes considered natural resources such as wildlife not the subject of private, 
but rather of common ownership, a form of distributional necessity among subsistence 
cultures.121 The harsh subsistence environment in which the Aleutians dwelt generated 
rules adhering to strict efficiency norms.  Among Aleutian groups, in the words of one 
scholar, “life is hard and the margin of safety small, and unproductive members of 
society cannot be supported[.]”122  It will be seen that to the characterization of  
“unproductive” can be added can be added those whose conduct disrupts the allocative 
efficiencies of the group.  Thus, these norms penalize resource overreaching and the 
arrogation of resources beyond one’s needs.
The Aleutians considered that treatment of land as commonly held, rather than 
susceptible of private ownership, to be the most efficient manner of maximizing hunting 
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resources.  Further, although captured game and hunting instruments might be considered 
private property, the community was “strongly hostile to the idea of anybody 
accumulating too much property for himself, and thereby limiting the amount of property 
that [could] be used by the community.”123  The ordinary remedy might be confiscation. 
The influential anthropologist Hoebel identified one Aleutian grouping that sustained 
keeping of an excess amount of goods could be considered a “capital crime.”124
Muslims are warned against the vice of covetousness in such language as is found 
in Sura 113:”SAY: I betake me for refuge to the Lord of the DAYBREAK * * * against 
the mischief of the envier when he envieth.”125  Further, “ Covet not the gifts by which 
God hath raised some of you above others.  The men shall have a portion according to 
their deserts.  The women shall have a portion according to their deserts. Of God, 
therefore, ask of his gifts.”126
An Indian folk tale relates the travails that may follow one who covets the wife of 
another.  The story is titled “The Village Teacher”, and is told in this way:
Following the passing of a village’s old and respected teacher, there arrived a new 
teacher “gifted with all those qualities which make us look wistfully on our departed 
youth: energy, health, ambition, hope and vanity.”  Women lived under severe 
restrictions, and until recently, “their womenfolk, both Hindu and Muslim, lived in 
purdah and would not leave the four walls of the house except with a veil hanging down 
to their toes.” These restrictions were somewhat lessened for women in the city.
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The vanity of the young school teacher and his condiscenson together prompted 
him to desire female companionship, and in particular a pretty and prosperous housewife.  
The woman’s son attended the school teacher’s school, and at the closing of school he 
would tell the boy: “Remember me to your mother".  The mother, being both intelligent 
and perceptive, deduced the teacher’s motives, and planned her response.  One day the 
boy told the teacher that his mother would like a word with the teacher at her home, and 
further that her husband was expected to be away.  Quite excited and dressed at his best, 
he arrived at the woman’s house, where he was received warmly.
As he drank the proffered tea, a call came from the yard.  It was the husband.  The 
wife began to tremble. "I am undone," she said, "if he discovers you here he will kill me 
and not spare you either."  "Have no fear," the teacher said, "he cannot be so harsh." "I 
know better how ruthless he is,” she quickly corrected the increasingly anxious teacher, 
“Would to God I were dead rather than be surprised in this compromising situation." She 
began to beat her breast. "O quick, save my life."  "Is there no other exit?" the teacher 
asked.  "No, none. He sees you here and I am killed. He is such a rough bear. Nothing 
can save me unless ....”   "Unless what?"  "Unless you disguise yourself to escape his 
suspicion." "Most willingly. I'll do anything for your sake" the teacher answered.   He 
was given a working woman’s cloak and scarf, and was placed before a basket of maize 
and two millstones. 
When the husband entered the home, he asked "What is that grinding sound 
upstairs?" "It is that deaf woman turning out maize flour", she responded.  As the 
husband and his wife passed time in the kitchen garden and in the barn, the teacher wore 
his hands to blisters pretending to be a working woman. "Revealing his awareness of the 
ruse, the husband said, finally, “The fellow must be tired now and feeling bitter – you had 
better dismiss him now. The lesson must have gone home to him." The housewife gave 
the teacher his clothes and he left hurridly.   The wife and her husband preserved the 
secret, although after this time, the people in the village It was remarked by many people 
the next day that the teacher had lost much of his spirit and liveliness. Some time later the 
housewife sent a message to the teacher asking is he should like to visit again.  This time 
he simply responded: "Ask her if she has consumed the flour ground previously."
III. CONCLUSION
Was H. G. Wells correct when in his OUTLINE OF HISTORY HE offered this vision 
of  the history of mankind’s law as “based upon a confused foundation of conventions, 
arbitrary assumptions, and [constitutes] a very impracticable and antiquated system 
indeed[.]” 127  Every observer must reach his or her own determination as to this.  The 
evidence that law, taken as a whole, demonstrates a tropism towards rationality and 
progressive values is probably equipreponderant with evidence that it does not.
The legal subset of tort law is at once discrete and sprawling.  The above 
discussion of ancient and primitive law confirms what Gregory C. Keating wrote 
regarding accident law alone, which is that tort law “curbs the freedom of prospective 
injurers and enhances the security of potential victims.  Risk impositions thus pit the 
liberty of injurers against the security of victims and the law of accidents sets the terms 
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on which these competing freedoms are reconciled.  Its task is to find and fix terms that 
are fair.” 128
What is the goal of the review contained in this article.  It cannot be to amuse 
ourselves with examples of how more efficient, transparent, humanitarian, or 
behaviorially expert we have become as we compare modern Western law to its ancient 
counterparts about the globe.  To begin, no responsible legal anthropologist, or for that 
matter no sociologist, should examine an incident of how another culture responded to a 
social need and do so only after removing the subject from it s context, taking it, in a 
sense, by forceps and removing it from its carefully constructed diorama.  All of us have 
mused at one point or another as to how incomprehensible certain things or affairs of our 
modern lives would  appear to visitors – of this world or another – who might a thousand 
years from know encounter such things as stranded, a contextual relics.  As is true today 
was true also in ancient times: very, very few legal rules have no social bona fides; very 
few rules are per se meritless.  
Further, our legal exploration cannot be to congratulate ourselves that modern 
Western civil code and common law legal systems have seemingly achieved consistent 
levels of efficient and moral norms.  For every arguably progressive initiative one state 
may take, such as the implementation of social host liability for permitting an inebriated 
guest to say good evening and drive away, there is a setback, such as the decisions of 
courts to disallow  public nuisance claims to be brought against the manufacturers of 
128
 Gregory C. Keating, The Social Contract Conception of The Tort Law of Accidents, Chapter 2 in 
PHILOSPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS  23  (Gerald J. Postema, ed.)(Cambridge 2001).
small concealable handguns and who drown counties surrounding large metropolitan 
areas with these weapons well knowing that the guns will end up on the city streets.  
The objective of such a review is to unveil and to examine examples of how other 
cultures in distant times responded to a social imperative that has been constant for all of 
man’s days:  How may social groups, large and small, respond to the need to cabin 
individual behavior to advance common well being.  What mechanisms work best to 
cabin or deter behavior that saps the well being of the larger group, and what 
inducements are most likely to increase the incidence of behavior that conduces to the 
public good. W
hat has this inquiry revealed? What are the identifiable consistencies between the 
discrete but representative cultures referenced?  First and foremost, it is shown that a 
standard of egalitarianism typically characterizes primitive groups deriving sustenance 
from hunting or agriculture.129  Beyond this, perhaps the greatest consistency between 
and among the legal norms and rules discussed is that of proscriptions of unconsented-to 
taking.  Whether the delict involved deprivation of another’s right to their own reputation 
or the theft of goods, no human group, even in the earliest time, permitted one individual 
to take from another simply because he was stronger, more cruel, faster or less principled, 
i.e., simply because he could otherwise get away with it.   The collective was better 
served by deterring such behavior with such remedies as requiring the return of what was 
owed, be it the return of the object or its equivalent, or the money, or in the case of a 
dignitary harm, the rendering of an apology or its symbolic equivalent – suffering the 
penalty that would accompany the false allegation had it been true.
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A similar congruence can be seen in the treatments of trespass to land or private 
nuisance.  If the harm to the property, or the interruption of the occupant’s right to 
profitably exploit it, could be quantified in lost crops or otherwise, the amends would be
in kind.  In turn public nuisance, which in early times could often be described in general 
terms as behavior that detracted from good of the general community, the culprit might 
first receive a sound thrashing in the hopes that it would deter continued deleterious 
behavior.   Lastly, it is seen that the remedies available under numerous law systems were 
quite sophisticated in the rectificatory quality of permissible awards, and included not 
only compensation in rough equivalence to the immediate severity of the harm suffered, 
but also, when appropriate, costs of care and rehabilitation, as well as lost income.  
Certain progressive or humanitarian progress is also evident.  In several examples 
discussed above the penalty for delicts ranging from manslaughter to battery to 
kidnapping might corporal or even death.   Or the transgression might result in vendetta, 
or in a blood oath, binding the parties and their families to a violent continuation.  With 
the passage of time, though, there were introduced alternative means of remedying such 
wrongs, to wit, the payment of money to the victim or to his or her family developments 
that brought the rectificatory norms into greater alignment with modern standards of 
corrective justice.
And so while this short article has provided, I hope, a diverting romp in the fact 
and the lore of ancient normative treatment of civil wrongs, it is also a praesces of the 
wheres, the whens, and the whos of the origins of our modern tort law.  It can been seen 
that the carbon dating of the roots of modern common law reach back further than the rise 
of a lawyer class in pre-Empire England, and with regard to the modern civil code 
treatments for extra-contractual harm, the origins antedate too even the Roman law that 
underlay the Code Napoleon.
